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Abstract 
This paper reviews economic principles for optimality of the taxation 
of international profit, from both a global and national perspective. It 
argues that for traditional systems based on the residence of the 
investor or the source of the income, nothing less than full 
harmonisation across countries can achieve global optimality. The 
conditions for national optimality are more difficult to identify, but are 
most likely to imply source-based taxation. However, source-based 
taxation requires an allocation of the profits of multinational 
companies to individual jurisdictions; this is not only very difficult in 
practice, but in some cases is without any conceptual foundation. The 
taxation of interest income on a residence basis is also hard to justify if 
the aim of the tax system is to tax only the income arising from 
economic activity in a given country.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper addresses the basic principles of the taxation of income from outbound 
direct investment by multinational corporations. Several countries are currently in the 
process of reviewing their systems of taxing such international income, including the 
UK, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.1 Within the EU, recent changes 
have been prompted partly by various cases in the European Court of Justice. More 
generally, the importance of the taxation of international income is growing 
continually as companies and their activities become increasingly internationally 
mobile. 
 
Two broad systems of taxing the income from outbound direct investment can be 
observed (although there are many variations in practice). The first is an exemption 
system: foreign income earned by foreign subsidiaries of a multinational company is 
not taxed by the home country of the parent company (although interest received by 
the parent from foreign subsidiaries generally is taxed). The second is a limited credit 
system, under which profit repatriated to the parent in the form of dividends is subject 
to home country tax, with a credit being given for foreign taxes already paid up to the 
limit of the home country liability. 
 
There are several reasons why the taxation of such income has recently come under 
review. Perhaps most importantly, countries appear to be increasingly engaged in 
competition with each other to attract mobile capital and firms. A significant element 
of such competition is to attract headquarters (or regional headquarters) of 
multinational companies. The location of headquarters appears to be increasingly 
driven by tax issues2 – for example, recently several UK firms have announced that 
they are moving their headquarters to other countries for tax reasons. The relevant 
aspects of the tax system for such decisions include the tax rate, but they also include 
                                                 
1 HM Treasury and HM Revenue and Customs (2007), United States Department of the Treasury, 
Office of Tax Policy (2007), Advisory Panel on Canada’s System of International Taxation (2008), 
Australian Department of the Treasury (2002) and New Zealand Inland Revenue Department and New 
Zealand Treasury (2007). 
2 See empirical evidence in Voget (2008). 
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the extent to which worldwide income generated by a multinational company is taxed 
on receipt by the parent company. 
 
A related issue, and one which is important in determining policy, is the need by 
governments to protect the base of their corporation tax. Companies may seek to shift 
profits to low tax jurisdictions to avoid the tax levied in high tax countries. They can 
do this in a number of ways, including simply concentrating their borrowing in high 
tax countries (where the interest paid will receive tax relief at a high rate), or mis-
pricing cross-border transactions within the company. In this setting, the taxation of 
repatriated dividend income may limit such profit shifting if the income is ultimately 
repatriated to the parent. 
 
The paper has two main aims. First, it aims to review and extend the existing 
academic literature on the optimal structure of taxes on international corporate profit. 
This has been studied for nearly half a century, yet there remains considerable 
confusion about the prescriptions offered by such theory in a modern setting. A 
fundamental question addressed by the paper is whether income of a domestic 
corporation which arises abroad should be subject to taxation in the home country. 
This is addressed in Sections 2 and 3.  
 
This question is considerably complicated by the fact that if such income is not taxed 
on accrual in the same way as domestic income, then there may be opportunities for 
domestic corporations to shift “domestic” income abroad to escape domestic taxation. 
Such income shifting in turn requires anti-avoidance rules, which almost inevitably 
involve the taxation of income apparently earned abroad. The second aim of the 
paper, addressed in Section 4, is to consider these issues in the light of general 
principles. 
 
Given such considerations, it is possible to distinguish two broad approaches: (1) 
foreign corporate income is generally exempt from domestic tax, though with 
exceptions to prevent excessive profit shifting; and (2) foreign corporate income is 
generally subject to tax on accrual by the home country, though with exceptions for 
specific types of income, or for income arising in specific foreign jurisdictions.  
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Historically, governments have probably had the second of these approaches in mind 
when designing their systems of taxing corporate income arising abroad. But the 
world is becoming increasingly international, and it is by no means clear that the 
historic norms should continue to guide the principles of international tax policy. This 
paper therefore attempts to set out some underlying principles which might be fit for 
at least the first part of the 21st century.  
 
In reviewing such principles, a distinction must immediately be made as to the aims of 
the tax system. Specifically, principles might be rather different if the aim is to 
maximise global income, compared with the aim of maximising domestic income. 
This paper considers both possibilities. It begins with the aim of maximising global 
income and analyses tax structures which are consistent with the production efficiency 
concept of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). Production is allocated efficiently 
throughout the world if it is not possible to reallocate resources between activities in a 
way that would increase total output. The paper shows that in a real-world situation in 
which there are cross-border flows of portfolio and direct investment, and also 
international trade, then all traditional forms of taxation would be distorting unless 
they were completely harmonised.  
 
By contrast, in the same situation, this paper argues that from a national perspective it 
is generally optimal to exempt the income from outbound investment from tax. This is 
contrary to the standard prescription of economic theory, which argues that outbound 
investment should be taxed on accrual at the same rate as domestic investment, with 
foreign taxes paid being deductible from the residence country tax base (although note 
that this system is not generally observed in practice).  The reason for the difference 
stems from the substitutability of domestic and outbound investment. If £1 of 
outbound investment crowds out £1 of domestic investment, then the standard results 
hold. But if both forms of direct investment are financed at the margin by inbound 
portfolio investment, then the link between them is broken. In this case, it is not 
necessarily optimal to tax outbound investment at the same rate as domestic 
investment. If links between domestic and outbound investment are reintroduced, then 
links are likely to be specific to the circumstances; as such is it is unlikely that a 
general tax system can accommodate them.  
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If the presumption from a national perspective is in favour of exempting corporate 
income earned abroad, then there is a need to identify income which is earned at 
home. In a modern open economy, such a task is fraught with difficulty. The basic 
problem is that it may be impossible, even conceptually, to identify that part of a 
multinational company’s income which is generated in the home (or indeed, any 
other) country. For example, suppose the central management of the company is 
resident in the home country, but that all operations are undertaken in other countries. 
Attempting to tax that part of the multinational’s income which is due to the central 
management – as opposed to any operational activities – requires a value to be given 
to those activities which is extremely difficult to identify. Further, the multinational 
company may even make higher profit because it operates globally; being able to 
exploit different factors in different countries. If so, then the requirement to allocate 
its profits between jurisdictions may have no underlying conceptual basis at all.   
 
In practice, governments distinguish between various forms of income which they 
believe are more or less mobile, and tax them differently. A typical distinction here is 
between “passive” and “active” income; passive income is typically defined to 
include, for example, receipts of interest, royalties and other fees. The basic 
presumption of many tax systems is that passive income arising abroad potentially 
reflects income shifting out of the home country and should therefore be taxed on an 
accruals basis as if it had arisen in the home country.3 However, such a position is too 
extreme since clearly not all such income has been shifted in this way; hence typically 
a variety of exceptions to this treatment have been introduced.  
 
The distinction between passive and active income has its roots in the distinction in 
the broad international tax system that different forms of income are treated 
differently. The classic example of this is of the different treatment of the returns to 
debt and equity finance. Interest payments (and other payments, such as fees and 
royalties) are typically taxed in the country in which they are received rather than the 
country in which the underlying return out of which they are paid is earned. Of 
course, most economists would argue that tax systems should not discriminate 
between the returns to debt and equity-financed investments at all. But given that 
                                                 
3 Such a distinction is present in many tax systems.  
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virtually all corporate tax systems in the world do make this distinction, then their 
international treatment also becomes problematic.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 and 3 discuss a number of issues in the 
determination of the optimal treatment of international income, first from the 
viewpoint of the world as a whole, and then from the viewpoint of the country from 
which outbound investment occurs. Section 4 discusses in more detail the difficulties 
of implementing a system which aims to tax only income arising in the domestic 
economy.  Section 5 briefly addresses the design of the tax base, and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
 
 
2. Economic principles for global optimisation 
 
The best-known concepts relating to the optimal taxation of international capital 
income date back to the 1960s, in contributions from Peggy Musgrave (Richman, 
1963, Musgrave, 1969). Initially we take “international capital income” to include any 
income which represents the return to saving or investment, where the income is 
initially generated in a country other than that in which the saver or investor resides. 
The country in which the income is initially generated is usually referred to as the 
“source” country, although this is by no means straightforward to identify in practice, 
or even in theory, as we discuss below. The saver or investor can be an individual, and 
company or an intermediary. The investment could in principle be portfolio or direct 
(it is considered direct if the investor has some control over the activity generating the 
return). Below we distinguish between portfolio investment undertaken by individuals 
or their intermediaries, and direct investment undertaken by corporations. However, to 
summarise the previous literature, we begin by neglecting this distinction. 
 
Musgrave introduced the terms “capital export neutrality (CEN)” and “capital import 
neutrality (CIN)”, which are now in common use. CEN holds if any individual 
investor faces the same effective tax rate on her investments, wherever those 
investments are located. CIN holds if all investments undertaken in the same 
jurisdiction face the same effective tax rate.  
 5 
 Suppose that, at the margin and in the absence of taxation, competition drives the 
marginal pre-tax rate of return on all investments in a jurisdiction to be equalised. 
Then in a simple framework (see, for example, Keen, 1993) CEN implies that (a) the 
international tax system will not distort the location decisions of any individual 
investor, (b) the pre-tax rate of return in all jurisdictions will be the same (production 
will be efficiently organised), but (c) investors in different jurisdictions may face 
different post-tax rates of return on their investment, and hence different incentives to 
save. CIN implies that (a) the marginal pre-tax rates of return will differ across 
jurisdictions (there will not be production efficiency), but (b) investors in different 
jurisdictions will face the same post-tax rate of return on each of their investments, 
and hence all face the same incentive to save.  
 
To analyse this in more detail, suppose that there are two countries, A and B, with one 
investor and one asset in each country. For now we will abstract from the nature of the 
investor and the investment; we consider this in more detail in Section 2.3 below. The 
rate of return on each asset depends on the amount invested in that asset: as more is 
invested, the marginal rate of return declines. Each investor can purchase shares in 
either asset. The effective tax rates may depend on the location of the investor and the 
location of the asset: for example, ABt  is the effective tax rate faced by the investor 
resident in A on the returns from the asset located in B. We will return in Section 5 
below to the question of how these effective tax rates are defined.  
 
In principle, each investor would want to invest in each asset up to the point at which 
the post-tax rate of return from each investment was the same: if the post-tax rate of 
return was not the same, then the investor could increase her overall return by 
switching from the investment with the lower rate of return to the investment with the 
higher rate of return.  
 
However – at least in the absence of risk - it is by no means certain that both investors 
will hold both assets simultaneously: indeed it is unlikely that they will do so without 
some pattern in effective tax rates. That is because both investors share the same pre-
tax rate of return on each asset; but if they face different effective tax rates, they will 
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face different post-tax rates of return. In general, they will not both be able to equalise 
their post-tax rates of return. If they do not, then only one investor would hold both 
assets, and the other would specialise in the one generating the higher post-tax rate of 
return. 
  
CEN holds in both countries if ABAA tt =  and that BBBA tt = : that is, each individual 
investor faces the same effective tax rate on the returns from both assets. In this 
special case, equalising post-tax rates of return for either investor will ensure that the 
pre-tax rates of return from the two assets will also be equal, implying that production 
will be efficiently organised. In this case as well, both investors can hold both assets – 
though if their tax rates differ -  BBAA tt ≠  - then their post-tax rates of return will 
also differ.  
 
By contrast, CIN holds in both countries if BAAA tt =  and BBAB tt = : that is both 
investors face the same effective tax rate when investing in a single asset. In this case, 
and assuming that the effective tax rates on the two assets are different from each 
other, equalisation of post-tax rates of return will not generate equalisation of pre-tax 
rates of return. However, the post-tax rates of return faced by each investor will be the 
same. 
 
The distinction between these two notions of neutrality has led to some debate as to 
which is the more important (see, for example, Keen, 1993). The economic literature 
has generally favoured CEN, on the grounds that it generates production efficiency 
(discussed further below), though this has not always met with approval. Thus, for 
example, McLure (1992) has claimed that: “economists have generally favoured CEN 
because it maximises global welfare ... but businessmen generally favor the ‘level 
playing field’ provided by CIN”.  
 
However, through a number of contributions discussed below, the question of the 
optimal tax structure has now progressed well beyond a simple analysis of CEN and 
CIN. The remainder of this section reviews and develops broader principles.  
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2.1. Global optimisation and production efficiency 
 
The starting point for an analysis of optimal tax systems is the Diamond and Mirrlees 
(1971) framework which demonstrated that, within a single country, it is optimal to 
preserve production efficiency. This holds when it is not possible to increase total 
output by reallocating inputs to different uses; which implies that the marginal pre-tax 
rate of return is the same on all investments. If this does not hold, then total output 
could be increased by shifting capital inputs from a less productive use to a more 
productive use. Competition between investors would achieve this in the absence of 
distorting taxes.  
 
However, a number of caveats must be made before simply accepting that production 
efficiency is optimal. First, the Diamond-Mirrlees theorem relies on two critical 
assumptions: that there are no restrictions on the use of tax instruments available to 
the government, and that economic rent is fully taxed at 100%4 (or there is no 
economic rent). Keen and Piekola (1996) analyse optimal tax rates between co-
operating countries when economic rents exist but cannot be taxed at a rate of 100%. 
In this case, the optimal tax system depends on similar factors to those identified by 
Horst (1980); namely the elasticity of the supply of savings and the elasticity of the 
demand for capital in each jurisdiction. Keen and Piekola also show that the optimal 
tax structure depends on the rate at which economic rents are taxed.5  
 
A second caveat was introduced by Keen and Wildasin (2004). They point out that the 
Diamond-Mirrlees model does not directly apply in an international setting, since 
there is no longer a single government budget constraint, but each country has its own 
budget constraint. They analyse the case in which lump sum transfers between 
governments are ruled out, but where transfers can instead take place via trade taxes 
and subsidies. Under these circumstances, it may be the case that the optimal (Pareto-
efficient) tax system does not generate production efficiency. However, as pointed out 
by Edwards (2005), if the aim is to generate a global optimum, it is not clear why 
governments should co-operate by adjusting their trade taxes, rather than agreeing to 
                                                 
4 See Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971).  
5 Huizinga and Nielsen (1995, 1996) analyse optimal tax policy when economic rents are taxed at less 
than 100%, in the absence of cooperation amongst governments.  
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lump-sum transfers. In the latter case, we are effectively returned to the Diamond-
Mirrlees setting of a single budget constraint.  
 
Although the global optimality of production efficiency is an important issue, we now 
leave these caveats to one side. In the following discussion, we instead focus on the 
implications for the design of international taxes on profit of a requirement for 
production efficiency. We then consider in Section 3 the rather different case of 
national optimality. 
 
 
2.2. Capital ownership neutrality 
 
Based on the simple choice between CEN and CIN, in a very simple framework, then 
the aim of production efficiency generates a presumption in favour of CEN. However, 
before developing the underlying framework further, we discuss the third form of 
neutrality: “capital ownership neutrality (CON)”. This term was used by Devereux 
(1990) and by Desai and Hines (2003), although the use of the term is different 
between the two contributions. Let us begin with a discussion of the Desai and Hines 
concept. They note that much foreign direct investment takes the form of acquisitions, 
rather than greenfield investment. This is consistent with there being differences in 
productivity according to the owner of an asset; the classic example is of a 
multinational firm being more productive than a domestic firm (there is a wealth of 
empirical evidence on this: see, for example, Criscuolo and Martin, 2004). Now 
suppose that investor A would have a more productive use of an asset than the current 
owner, investor B. In the absence of other factors, and taxes, there would be a 
improvement in world output (and potential gains to both A and B) if A purchased the 
asset from B. CON, as used by Desai and Hines, is a condition that the tax system 
does not distort the ownership of assets; in this case, the international tax system does 
not prevent A purchasing the asset from B.  
 
To analyse this in more detail, return to the simple framework above. However, now 
suppose that the rate of return on each asset depends on the identity of the investor: 
for example, for the asset in A, AAp  is the pre-tax rate of return earned by the 
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investor residing in A, and  is the pre-tax rate of return earned by the investor 
residing in B. To make things more concrete, suppose that, whatever the total size of 
the asset in A, the investor from A is more productive: that is, 
BAp
BAAA pp > .  
 
Begin with investor A. In the absence of taxes, he will invest in asset A, which for a 
small investment suppose yields a return higher than asset B. He will continue to 
invest in asset A until the marginal return from asset A falls to the level of asset B,6 
that is until the pre-tax rates of return are the same: AAp p= AB . The position of 
investor B depends exactly on how we define ownership. Desai and Hines seem to 
have in mind discrete ownership: either asset A is owned by investor A or by investor 
B, but not both. In this case, in equilibrium investor B would generally simply hold 
asset B.7  
 
In the presence of taxes, the conditions are similar, except that the investors’ 
investment allocations will depend on post-tax rates of return instead of the pre-tax 
rates of return. The introduction of a completely general tax system could generate an 
equilibrium in which investor B owns asset A instead of investor A. That is, if A were 
taxed at a very high rate on the return from asset A, while B were taxed at a very low 
rate on the return from asset A, then B may value the asset more highly than A. This 
case would violate the Desai/Hines notion of CON. To ensure CON holds we 
therefore require conditions on the effective tax rates such that investor A continues to 
own asset A.   
 
So far, however, we have effectively treated the investment by either investor as a 
new investment. What if B owns the asset, but A wishes to purchase it 
since BAAA pp >
BA
? As noted by Becker and Fuest (2007), the price at which B is 
prepared to sell the asset should reflect the tax rate he faces on the return. If 
AAt t> , then in the absence of the additional pre-tax return generated by A, A 
would value the asset at a lower value than B. A would only purchase the asset if the 
                                                 
6 It is also possible that given his wealth, and lack of any further finance, the rate of return on asset A 
remains higher than the rate of return on asset B; in this case, investor A would invest only in asset A. 
However, we do not analyse this possibility. 
7 However, if B can hold a minority share in asset A (which is controlled managed and controlled by 
A), then B could also earn AAp . However, we will not examine this case either. 
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additional return generated by A owning the asset at least compensates for this 
difference in valuation. 
 
In general – as Desai and Hines argue - CON will hold if A and B face the same 
overall effective tax rate as each other on the returns to any asset: that is, BAAA tt =  
and BBAB tt = . (In this framework, this is equivalent to the condition for capital 
import neutrality). This would occur if the returns to the asset were taxed only in the 
location of the asset, and not in the residence location of the investors (which may be 
different). This in turn is consistent with the investors’ residence countries exempting 
foreign source income from tax, the case emphasised by Desai and Hines.  
 
However, now let us add, in turn, two further elements. First, we have so far discussed 
only the position of unspecified investors; we have not yet distinguished between 
investment undertaken by individuals and investments undertaken by corporations. 
Second, we have not yet considered in detail the role of competition between 
companies, including international trade.  
 
 
2.3. Distinguishing portfolio and direct investment 
 
Devereux (2000) analyses simultaneously the optimality properties of personal taxes 
on capital income, and taxes on corporate profit. A useful framework for this 
distinction is to suppose that individuals (possibly indirectly through investment 
vehicles) undertake portfolio investment in corporations. These corporations need not 
be resident in the same country as the individual investor: despite a home bias in 
portfolio investment, there is considerable cross-border portfolio investment. 
Corporations, in turn, raise finance from individual investors around the world, and 
undertake direct investment; again, the direct investment can be domestic, or cross-
border.  
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Given perfect capital mobility for portfolio investment, and abstracting from risk,8 
then the post-corporation tax rate of return required by companies must be equalised 
across all companies, no matter where they are located. (Note that in principle the 
return may be subject to a number of taxes: the general principles discussed here 
relate to all taxes levied though we shall continue to refer for simplicity just to 
corporation tax). In equilibrium, taxes levied on individual shareholders may affect 
the post-corporation tax, pre-personal tax, rate of return, required of companies, but 
that same rate is required of all companies. We treat personal taxes as being levied on 
a residence basis: any withholding tax levied on payments to all shareholders is for 
this purpose treated as a tax on the corporation. A change to any individual’s personal 
tax rate may affect her allocation of investments, and may affect her post-tax rate of 
return. However, as long as each investor is small relative to the market (or each 
group of investors is small) such a change in tax rates will not affect the required post-
corporation tax rates of return. Devereux (2000) analyses the required relationship 
between corporate and personal taxes in such a setting: here we abstract from personal 
taxes altogether in order to focus solely on corporate taxes. How does such a setting 
affect the requirements for achieving production efficiency? 
 
The key new ingredient created by considering portfolio and direct investment is that 
the post-corporation tax rate of return required from direct investment by corporations 
is now fixed. In terms of the framework used above, it is straightforward to reinterpret 
the investors described above as being corporations. In this case the effective tax rates 
are effective corporate tax rates. The key difference, however, is that the post-
corporation tax rate of return is fixed, and is common across all companies. 
 
Like Desai and Hines (2003), Devereux (2000) also considers the case in which the 
productivity of an asset depends on the company which owns it. However, Devereux 
(2000) considers a more general problem than simply the ownership of a single asset. 
Suppose, for example, that each company operates in each country through wholly-
owned subsidiaries. Then the pre-tax rates of return on the assets in a single country 
need not be equal to each other.  
                                                 
8 There is an extensive literature which analyses portfolio investment decisions in the presence of risks 
and differential taxes on capital income, see, for example, Brennan (1970), Gordon and Bradford 
(1980) and Bond, Devereux and Klemm (2007). However, we abstract from these issues here.  
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 Consider this case first in the absence of tax. If one firm were more productive than 
another, it would generate a higher rate of return. This would attract more capital from 
individual investors. As the company expanded, its marginal rate of return would 
decline (and that of the other company would increase if it had less capital). In 
equilibrium, the two companies would earn the same marginal rate of return. But in 
the presence of corporation tax, post-tax rates of return must be equalised. Differences 
in effective corporate tax rates must therefore affect only pre-tax rates of return.  
 
How do the neutrality concepts work in this context?  There is no impact on the 
implications for how CEN can be achieved, except that the requirements for neutrality 
now specifically apply to effective corporation tax rates: as long as each company 
faces the same effective corporate tax rate on all its investments then location 
decisions will not be distorted.  
 
However, CEN on its own is no longer sufficient to achieve production efficiency. 
Suppose CEN holds, but that the effective tax rate faced by company A exceeds that 
faced by company B. Then the pre-tax rates of return earned by company A must 
exceed those earned by company B: production efficiency would not hold.  
 
It is also clear that if only one country introduced CEN, this would not generate 
production efficiency. For example, if only A introduced CEN, the pre-tax rates of 
return would differ between the two companies, and they would also differ across the 
different investments undertaken by B. This calls into question the notion of some 
individual countries (see, for example, HM Treasury and HMRC, 2007) that they aim 
to achieve CEN for their own investors. On its own, this is not optimal either at a 
global level or for an individual country (see below).9  
 
What of CIN? This is more complex, since to some extent this is a neutrality property 
in search of a rationale. When introducing this concept, we noted that – in a simple 
framework – CIN would imply that all investors faced the same post-tax rate of return 
                                                 
9 Note though that although some countries may aim broadly to achieve CEN, no country has actually 
implemented a system which would achieve this. It would involve, for example, rebating foreign tax 
liabilities which were in excess of domestic liabilities. 
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(though pre-tax rates of return would differ across countries). However, this is not an 
issue for the optimality of corporation taxes if all companies are required to earn the 
same post-corporation tax rates of return. The ultimate post-tax rate of return earned 
by investors will be affected by their personal tax rates on capital income, but not on 
corporation taxes.  
 
However, the “level playing field” mentioned by McLure (1992) suggests another 
interpretation of CIN, emphasised by Devereux (1990, 2000). This is that companies 
from A and B compete with each other in each country. Suppose, for example, that 
each company produces a similar good in each country, and competes with the other 
company in the market in that country. The pre-tax rate of return required by each 
company will affect the price at which it can afford to sell its good. In general, the 
higher is the relevant tax rate faced by the company on its investment, the higher will 
be the price at which it must sell its own good. But if CIN holds - BAAA tt =  and 
BBAB tt =  - then the companies face the same effective tax rates in each country, so 
that neither company will gain a competitive advantage.   
 
Thus, if producers sell their product only in the country in which the good or service 
is produced, then levying the same effective tax rate on all producers in that country is 
a sufficient condition for taxes not to distort competition. This is equivalent to an 
exemption system in all residence countries.  
 
Although this is a form of CIN, it might also be considered a form of CON. In this 
setting, CON continues to require an exemption for foreign source income (or at least 
a tax system which is equivalent). That is, to avoid distortions to the corporate 
ownership of assets in any jurisdiction, all companies which may purchase assets 
there must face the same effective rate of tax.  
 
However, the concept of fair competition outlined here is more general than CON, 
since the change of ownership considered in CON could be achieved not by 
acquisition, but by firm A simply entering the market and undercutting B. For 
example, it is possible that there are reasons why A would not purchase the assets of 
B, even if it was more productive (for example, due to high transactions costs, or B 
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being unwilling to sell). In this case, A and B would compete in the same market. 
Ultimately, it is possible that B could go out of business, to be replaced by A (which 
would take us back to the analysis in the previous section, instead of assuming that 
both countries operate in both markets).  
 
A broader interpretation of CON is therefore that one company has no competitive 
advantage over another as a result of differential effective tax rates depending on 
ownership.  
 
 
 
2.4. International trade 
 
But the sense in which the term CON was used by Devereux (1990) refers to a still 
broader concept, which also requires consideration of another dimension: 
international trade. In practice, companies do not always sell their output in the 
location of production: they can export the output to other countries. This has a 
profound impact on the requirement for production efficiency. Suppose companies A 
and B compete with each other in a third country. To avoid any distortion to 
competition in the third market, it would be necessary for both companies to face the 
same effective tax rate. Yet, typically corporation taxes are not levied on a destination 
basis – where the output is sold. So there would not necessarily be any tax levied in 
the third country. Instead, tax would be levied either in the “source” country, where 
the investment takes place, or the “residence” country, where the company’s 
management and control takes place.  Yet A and B may compete with each other even 
if their source and residence locations are different from each other.  
 
It is perhaps useful to define a new term - market neutrality – which holds if taxes do 
not distort competition between companies; that is, one company does not derive a 
tax-induced competitive advantage over another.10 It is clear from this analysis that 
market neutrality would require full harmonisation of source- and residence-
corporation taxes. That is, the effective tax rates faced by all potential competitors in 
                                                 
10 This is the original sense of CON, as used by Devereux (1990), but “market neutrality” is probably a 
more accurate name. 
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any third country would need to be the same. This is clearly a much more demanding 
requirement than achieving CON in the Desai and Hines sense, which can be achieved 
by an exemption system, generating source country taxation.11  
 
 
 
 
2.5. Summary of principles for global optimisation 
 
In a world with direct and portfolio investment, in which all companies worldwide are 
required to earn a given post-tax rate of return, the principles of CEN, CIN and CON 
need some revision. With regard to the optimal setting of corporation tax, the 
principle that different individual savers should face the same post-tax rate of return is 
no longer relevant, since corporation taxes in any one country typically have no 
impact on this rate of return.  
 
That leaves the principle of production efficiency. It is true that production efficiency 
is Pareto optimal only under certain conditions. However, there is no comparable and 
clear principle in cases where these conditions do not hold. As Slemrod (1995) has 
argued, the situation here is comparable to the principle of free trade. The conditions 
under which free trade are optimal are well known; while it is possible that these 
conditions do not hold, most economists still consider free trade to be a useful guiding 
principle. The same could be said for production efficiency.  
 
Other “principles” are therefore subsidiary to production efficiency. Based on the 
discussion above, production efficiency implies two “principles: 
 
1. Direct “CEN”: that taxes should not distort the location of corporate activity 
2. Market neutrality: that taxes should not distort competition (even in a very 
broad sense) between any companies operating in the same market12 
 
                                                 
11 It is for these reasons that the empirical papers of Devereux and Pearson (1995) and Devereux and 
Loretz (2008) consider the proximity of European tax systems to full harmonisation.  
12 Devereux (2000) and Devereux and Pearson (1995) summarized the principles as Direct CEN and 
Direct CIN. If both of these hold, then so do the two principles set out here.  
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The second of these principles is in some ways a more general concept of CON than 
the definition of Desai and Hines (2003). If it were the case that any less productive 
firm was immediately acquired by a more productive firm, then all (remaining) firms 
would be equally productive. In this case there would be no harm to competition, 
since all firms would be equally productive. But if such acquisitions do not always 
occur – as seems likely, given costs of acquisition - then we are left with firms of 
different levels of productivity co-existing. This introduces the more general principle 
above.  
 
In a world where the post-corporation tax rate of return required for all companies is 
the same, production efficiency cannot be achieved by residence- or source-based 
taxes unless they are fully harmonised. In the absence of sufficient international 
agreement to achieve that outcome, a question arises as to whether is it possible to 
identify which of these two forms of taxation generate the greater welfare costs? 
Source-based taxation distorts location choice and competition generated by 
international trade; residence-based taxation distorts competition generated by cross-
border investment and international trade. However, given that all these factors are 
closely related - for example, decisions of location involve the choice between cross-
border investment and trade - any argument in favour of one form of taxation on this 
basis would be precarious. 
 
 
 
 
3. Economic principles for national optimisation 
 
So far the discussion has focused on the conditions needed to achieve global 
production efficiency. But this almost inevitably requires international cooperation. 
Perhaps a more realistic goal for a national government is to maximise the welfare of 
its own citizens. In this section we address the issue of the optimal tax treatment of the 
returns to outbound investment from the perspective of the domestic economy only. 
Many of the issues raised in the previous section on global optimisation also apply 
here. This section begins by summarising the traditional approach, and then asks how 
the policy prescriptions are affected by factors ignored in the traditional approach. 
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The key new factor is the distinction between portfolio and direct investment, 
discussed above, which fixes the post-corporation tax rate of return required from a 
company located in a small open economy.   
 
3.1. The traditional approach 
 
Maximising national income, rather than global income, may generate a very different 
“optimal” tax structure for the taxation of cross-border income. As with the terms 
CEN and CIN, Musgrave (Richman, 1963, 1969) introduced the term “national 
neutrality” to describe optimal policy for an individual government. Supported by 
more the formal analysis of Feldstein and Hartman (1979), the key policy prescription 
is that a government should tax the worldwide income of its residents, treating foreign 
taxes as a cost (and hence allowing them to be deducted, but not allowing a credit).  
 
The rationale behind this is as follows. Suppose there is a fixed supply of saving, to be 
allocated between domestic and outbound investment. For the country as a whole, the 
optimal allocation of investment would equate the “social” rates of return from the 
two. In a simple framework,13 the social rate of return to the home country is the 
return net of foreign taxes, but before domestic taxes (since domestic taxes are used to 
benefit domestic residents). Hence the post-foreign tax rate of return on outbound 
investment should be set equal to the pre-tax rate of return on domestic investment. 
Private investors, however, will allocate investment to equalise post-tax rates of 
return. These two allocations are only the same under a worldwide tax system where 
foreign taxes are deductible from the home country tax base. 
 
Slemrod (1995) also justifies this approach with an analogy to free trade. In a basic 
economic model of a small open economy, it is inefficient to levy import tariffs or a 
source-based tax on capital income. But from the perspective of an exporting country, 
the existence of an import levy in the importing country does not justify any rebate to 
exports. Similarly, if the capital-importing country does have a source-based tax on 
capital income, that is no reason for the residence country to adjust its tax system: the 
                                                 
13 Strictly, where the marginal cost of public funds is unity.  
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residence country should levy tax on the returns net of foreign tax (which is an 
expense), and not give any credit.  
 
3.2. Distinguishing portfolio and direct investment 
 
A central assumption of the basic argument – explicitly stated in the Feldstein and 
Hartman (1979) model - is that there is a direct link between domestic and outbound 
investment: $1 more invested abroad reduces investment at home by $1. Yet this is 
not generally the case in practice. Indeed, in the framework of portfolio and direct 
investment set out above, domestic companies can raise unlimited finance on the 
world market at the world post-corporation tax rate of return. In this case, there may 
be no link at all between domestic and outbound investment, and hence no link 
between the optimal tax rates.  
 
This position is studied by Devereux (2004), who considers a small open economy 
that has both inward and outward portfolio and direct investment, and analyses the 
optimal relationship between the taxes on these different forms of investment. In this 
model, outbound investment does not crowd out domestic investment, since at the 
margin both forms of investment are financed by inward portfolio investment. In this 
case, the existence of a tax on domestic investment has no implications for the optimal 
effective tax rate for outbound investment. If the country as a whole has no market 
power (that is, all its firms together are small relative to the world market), then the 
optimal tax rate on outbound direct investment is zero. A similar result was implicitly 
found by Mintz and Tulkens (1996).  
 
If the country does have some market power, then it could be optimal to tax the 
outbound investment, to drive up the world price of the product. This is similar to the 
market power case for a tax on exports. However, it is not feasible to do this in 
practice with a general tax system applying all outbound investment.  
 
The argument that the appropriate tax on outbound investment is zero is in fact similar 
to the argument that the appropriate tax on inbound investment is zero (see, for 
example, Gordon, 1986). This is because if the outbound direct investment is financed 
at the margin by inbound portfolio investment, then it really can be considered a form 
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of inbound investment. The decision of a multinational company as to where to locate 
its parent company and headquarters is similar to any other location decision. A high 
tax rate associated with parent company location may induce the company to choose a 
different, lower taxed, location. In such a setting, there is no rationale for the 
government hosting the parent company to tax its worldwide income.  
 
In an extreme case in which the capital simply flows through the residence country of 
the parent, then there is unlikely to be any gain to that country from being an 
intermediary location. In that case, any tax levied by the residence country is likely to 
deter the company from routing capital in that way. However, there are likely to be 
some benefits of hosting the company headquarters, as long as some economic 
activity takes place there. Moreover, although at the margin finance may be provided 
on the world market, given home bias in portfolio investment allocations, it is likely 
that at least some shareholders are resident in the same country. If there are some 
benefits such as these, then imposing a tax on worldwide income will in general raise 
the required pre-tax rate of return, possibly giving the company a competitive 
disadvantage in foreign markets, and hence reducing the attractiveness of the 
residence country as a headquarters location.  
 
In this setting, it is possible to make the case against taxing the returns from outbound 
investment more forcefully by questioning the “nationality” of the company. Public 
comment still tends to refer to companies as a “UK multinational” or a “Canadian 
multinational”. But those terms are inherently contradictory. If a company is 
multinational, then how can it also be Canadian?  Perhaps such a term might be 
justified if the company’s shareholders were all Canadian residents, but with 
international portfolio investment, that is unlikely to be the case. What proportion of 
the shareholders would need to be Canadian residents for the term to be reasonable? 
Would the term be justified if the headquarters of the company is in Canada? That 
seems implausible as well, since the headquarters may reflect only a small part of the 
company’s activities. Indeed, Desai (2008) argues that even basic headquarter 
functions of multinational companies are typically now split, and located in different 
countries.  
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In a typical multinational company, then, some activity of the company may be taking 
place in the country of the headquarters, but those activities are best seen as just one 
of the many and varied activities that the company undertakes worldwide. It is not 
clear why that justifies that country taxing the worldwide income of the company. 
Certainly it is hard to make a case that the location of the management, or the place at 
which the company primarily raises finance, or the place in which it is listed, or some 
other aspect of the headquarters, is the crucial element of the company which justifies 
the government of that country taxing the worldwide income of the company.   
 
 
3.3. Introducing other links between domestic and outbound investment 
 
In a more complex model, the links between domestic and outbound investment may 
be more subtle. Devereux and Hubbard (2003) consider the case in which a domestic 
company may export to the foreign market or produce abroad: in either case it 
competes with a non-resident company making the same decision. In principle, the 
domestic government could modify its domestic tax system to manipulate the 
decisions of the company in a way which would give it a competitive advantage, and 
hence boost domestic welfare. However, the “optimal” tax system in this setting 
depends on the economic parameters facing the company: exemption, credit or 
deduction systems could all be optimal in different situations. Again, it is not feasible 
to adjust the tax system for outbound investment according to the specific 
characteristics of the tax payer. Another possible link between domestic and outbound 
investment, considered by Becker and Fuest (2007), is that there may be a limit to 
availability of management in the company: undertaking an investment in one 
location precludes undertaking another somewhere else. Taken to an extreme, this 
would reintroduce the one-for-one relationship between domestic and outbound 
investment assumed by Feldstein and Hartman (1979). 
 
There is now a growing empirical literature examining links between outbound and 
domestic investment (see, for example Simpson, 2008), which would imply an even 
more complex calculation of the optimal tax system. Again though, it is unlikely that 
the optimal system would be the same for all companies.   
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If governments cannot design tax systems which vary according to firm or sector 
characteristics, but are forced to implement general tax structures, then the reasoning 
above suggests that the underlying presumption should be in favour of a system which 
does not tax foreign income of domestic corporations.  
 
3.4. Summary of principles for national optimisation 
 
As with the principles for global optimisation, in a world in which all companies 
worldwide are required to earn a given post-tax rate of return, the presumption in 
favour of taxing worldwide income while allowing only a deduction for foreign taxes 
requires revision.  
 
In fact, the presumption should swing in entirely the opposite direction towards 
exempting income earned abroad from domestic tax. In general, any tax levied would 
raise the required pre-tax rate of return on the company which would lessen its ability 
to compete with companies headquartered in other countries. This conclusion is only 
reinforced by questioning the justification of a government to tax the worldwide 
income of a multinational whose headquarter is located in that country. There is no 
obvious special feature of the location of the headquarters that justifies the imposition 
of a tax on worldwide income, as opposed to income arising as a result of domestic 
activity. 
 
But the nature of the economic argument is important for policy. The argument is that 
the domestic country would actually be better off if it did not impose a tax on foreign 
income earned by corporations. This argument does not rely on the policy of the host 
country. But some countries apply an exemption system only in specific cases, for 
example to income arising in other countries with which they have a treaty. The 
argument here implies that they would be better off exempting all foreign source 
income, irrespective of the policy of the host government or the existence of treaties.   
 
 
 
4. Difficulties in identifying the location of profit 
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Unfortunately, identifying that there is no clear rationale for taxing the returns to 
outbound investment, and hence exempting income earned by foreign affiliates from 
domestic tax, is relatively straightforward compared to the problems of implementing 
a pure source-based tax system. A number of difficult problems arise as income and 
costs need in principle be allocated between jurisdictions. Yet not only is that difficult 
to achieve in practice, in many cases there is simply no conceptual basis to support 
any particular approach.  
 
The treatment of different forms of income creates another problem: for example, 
interest payments are typically taxed in the country where they are received, rather 
than the country from which they are paid; yet this is in contradiction to the general 
principle that tax should be levied only where the income-generating activity took 
place. It is not clear why the form of financing of a foreign affiliate by its parent 
should turn the international tax system from one based on source (for equity-financed 
investment) to one based on residence (for debt-financed investment).  
 
In this section we address these two issues in more depth; we finish with a brief 
discussion of the appropriate treatment of capital gains arising from the sale of an 
affiliate.  
 
 
 
4.1. Does source-based taxation have a sound conceptual foundation?  
 
The principle of exempting foreign source income from domestic taxation requires it 
to be possible to identify where corporate income is earned. A source-based 
international tax system would require a multinational company to allocate its profit 
between the taxing jurisdictions in which it operates. However, attempting to define 
where profit is generated is often very difficult, and in some cases impossible. Both 
income and costs arising in each jurisdiction in principle need to be identified.   
 
In a simple case, we can consider for example a British resident company that wholly 
owns a subsidiary which is registered, and which carries out all its activities – 
employment, production, sales – in, say, France. Then France would typically be 
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considered to be the source of the corporate profit. Conventionally, we can also drop 
sales from the list of activities: if the subsidiary exported all its product to Germany, 
France would still conventionally be regarded as the source of the profit (although in 
economic terms it is less clear why this would be the case). 
 
Things are less clear, however, if the British holding company owns several 
subsidiaries in different countries, which undertake different aspects of the 
multinational’s activities: for example, finance, marketing, R&D, production, sales. 
The existing system of separate accounting requires all transactions between these 
different parts of the group to be valued, in order to divide total profit between the 
countries involved. The contribution made by each would be determined using “arm’s 
length pricing” – in principle, the price that would be charged by each subsidiary for 
its services as if it were dealing with an unrelated party. Of course, such a procedure 
is difficult in practice since in many cases no such arm’s length price can be observed; 
transactions between subsidiaries of the same corporation may not be replicated 
between third parties. But in many cases, not only is this difficult to administer, it has 
no conceptual foundation.  
 
Further, it is in principle necessary to identify costs of financing with specific 
activities. For example, a pure source-based tax system would give relief only for 
interest payments which relate to debt finance used to undertake domestic activities: 
that is, there is in principle a need to allocate interest expenses between domestic and 
foreign uses. This is not just difficult in practice, however; it is not clear even whether 
there is a “correct” allocation conceptually. The multinational company may borrow 
in order to support its global activities; and it may have an overall desired gearing 
ratio. This would imply that borrowing for one activity would preclude borrowing for 
another activity. Which activity is actually financed by borrowing could be arbitrary. 
In this case, effectively there is simply an overall level of acceptable borrowing, and 
hence no conceptual basis on which to allocate interest payments between domestic 
and foreign uses. 
   
Conceptual problems in splitting profit between jurisdictions arise in arm’s length 
pricing as well. For example, suppose that the multinational has two R&D 
laboratories in different countries. Each R&D laboratory has invented, and patented, a 
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crucial element of the production technology. Each patent is worthless without the 
other. One measure of the arms length price of each patent is therefore clearly zero – a 
third party would not be prepared to pay anything for a single patent. Another possible 
measure would be to identify the arm’s length price of one patent if the purchaser 
already owned the other patent. But if both patents were valued in this way, then their 
total value could easily be larger than the value of the final output.  
 
More generally, it is far from clear that the arm’s length price used by independent 
parties would be the same as the price which would be transacted by affiliates within 
the same group: different organisational forms can be expected to arise because of 
differences between companies, which may be reflected in cost structures. The 
distortions created by imposing transfer pricing rules in this setting are explored in 
several papers.14 In a recent contribution, Devereux and Keuschnigg (2008) analyse 
how companies choose their organisational form: whether to expand abroad through 
foreign direct investment, and thereby own the foreign activity directly, or through 
outsourcing by licensing a third party to undertake the same activities. In this model, 
the choice of organisational form depends on the success probabilities of the firm. 
 
Crucially, however, the arm’s length price chosen in the outsourcing case depends on 
the characteristics of that case. For example in the absence of tax considerations, if 
there is a financial constraint, the parent company would not require the foreign 
subsidiary to make an upfront royalty payment; such a payment would reduce the 
scale of activities abroad, which would reduce aggregate profit. However, a positive 
royalty payment would be optimally chosen in the outsourcing case. Treating the 
royalty payment in the outsourcing case as the appropriate royalty in the FDI case 
would induce a distortion to the choice of organisational form and in the level of 
investment undertaken.15   
 
Identifying where profit is generated is a fundamental problem of conventional 
corporation taxes in an international setting. In some ways it is a problem with which 
the world has learned to live, even though allocating profit among source countries is 
in practice a source of great complexity and uncertainty. But this problem is not just 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Halperin and Srinidhi (1987, 1991) and Harris and Sansing (1998).  
15 Vann (2007) discusses a range of more practical problems with arm’s length principle. 
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one of complexity and uncertainty: it can – and perhaps should – also affect the 
fundamental design of the tax system. 
 
 
 
4.2. Distinguishing different forms of income  
 
Most countries tax the foreign-source interest, rents and royalties payments received 
by their residents, whether individuals or companies. The return to equity investment 
– a dividend receipt – is therefore typically taxed in a very different way to the returns 
from other forms of investment. This issue has not been directly addressed in the 
economic literature investigating the optimal taxation for foreign corporate income, 
and therefore requires some discussion.   
 
There are at least two different forms of payment here. The first reflects a return to 
activity which has taken place in the home country. In principle, for example, if a 
patent is developed by a British company, and a foreign affiliate is licensed to use that 
patent in its activity, then it would pay a royalty to the British owner of the patent for 
the right to use it. The receipt of this royalty would be taxed in the UK (but typically 
not in the other country). This does not contradict the general principle of exempting 
foreign income discussed above, since the royalty is in effect a return to the research 
and development activity which took place in the UK and which resulted in the patent.  
 
However, a second form of payment does appear to contradict the principle of 
exempting foreign income. A classic example here is the distinction between debt and 
equity. Typically, economists argue that the tax system should not differentiate 
between investment financed by debt and by equity. Indeed, in practice it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to distinguish the form of financial contracts, where such 
contracts may have some of the traditional elements of both debt and equity. 
However, let us leave to one side here the issue of whether debt and equity should be 
treated equally, and consider only the international aspect of this. If dividends 
received from foreign affiliates are exempt home country tax, then what is the 
appropriate treatment of interest received?  
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A natural starting point here would be to simply refer to the analysis above, which 
made no distinction according to the form of financial transaction between parent and 
foreign subsidiary. Suppose a British parent company raised finance on the world 
market in order to undertake an investment in France. The analysis above suggests 
that the UK should not seek to tax the income arising in France. The fact that the 
company may choose to finance the French subsidiary through debt, rather than 
through equity, should in principle make no difference. 
 
However, the structure of the international tax system is problematic here, since 
almost all countries would grant relief to the interest paid to the British parent (subject 
to host country thin capitalisation rules). If the UK were simply to exempt interest 
income received from foreign subsidiaries as implied above, then this income would 
not be taxed at the corporate level at all. Indeed, given the preferential treatment of 
interest payments by the subsidiary, there would be a significant advantage to British 
companies choosing to lend to their foreign subsidiaries.  
 
The issue here is that the basic structure of the international tax system for 
multinational companies is close to a source-based tax for equity-financed investment, 
but a corporate-residence based tax for debt financed investment. It is hard to think of 
a sensible economic rationale for this practice, especially when the finance provided is 
internal to the multinational company. One possible response to this distinction is to 
call for a worldwide change in this practice. But, more feasibly, the issue for an open 
economy such as the UK, is what its optimal policy should be, given the treatment of 
interest payments elsewhere.  
 
This issue is related to the issue of relief for interest payments by the British parent. If 
the basic aim of the tax system is to tax profit arising in the UK, then in principle 
relief should only given for interest payments made by the parent to the extent that the 
underlying borrowing was used to finance activities which took place in the UK. 
Conversely, if interest relief is not granted for payments for borrowing used to finance 
foreign activity, then there is no clear rationale for taxing interest received from 
foreign affiliates.  
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Exempting foreign source interest receipts from taxation would be a radical departure 
from the international norm, but one which is implied by the principle that only 
economic activity taking place in that jurisdiction should be taxed. One caveat to the 
recipient country introducing such a policy would be to consider whether the country 
could do better than leaving the interest entirely untaxed. Given that interest is usually 
taxed in the hands of the recipient, then home country collecting some tax revenue on 
interest receipts might have a negligible impact on incentives (relative to the no tax 
case) and therefore raise welfare in the home country.  
 
 
 
4.3. Capital gains  
 
Another form in which the return to an investment can be earned is through a capital 
gain. In an international case, a parent company may sell a foreign affiliate, rather 
than continuing to operate it. The price at which the affiliate can be sold should in 
principle reflect the net present value of post-tax earnings.16 The presumption here is 
that the affiliate is earning a return which is subject to corporation tax in the host 
country; if the home country of the parent does not seek to tax the dividend stream 
from the affiliate to the parent, then there is little rationale for taxing the capital gain 
earned from the sale of the affiliate.  
 
However, this argument applies equally to domestic affiliates. If a British parent has a 
British affiliate which is subject to British corporation tax, then the sale price of that 
affiliate should reflect the corporation tax due on the future returns that will be made. 
Imposing capital gains tax on the sale would be a form of double taxation which 
would be avoided in the case of dividends paid to the parent.  
 
Note that this argument applies to the sale of companies which generate a return 
subject to corporation tax. It does not necessarily apply to the sale of an asset which 
does not provide a stream of taxed returns but which simply appreciates in value, such 
as a work of art. In that case, imposing capital gains tax would not imply any double 
                                                 
16 This may reflect the value of the selling company or the acquiring company, but in either case, the 
price should reflect the post-corporation tax valuation.  
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taxation. The sale of assets owned by an affiliate is less clear. To the extent that the 
value of the asset is determined by the net present value of the post-tax return which 
the asset generates, then in principle capital gains tax would be a form of double 
taxation. But to the extent to which the asset valuation depends on other factors, then 
there may be a case for retaining a capital gains tax charge.  
 
 
 
 
5. Defining the Tax Base  
 
There are two fundamental questions in the taxation of the profits of multinational 
business. First, “where should the profit be taxed?”. This paper has primarily 
addressed this question. The second question is “what should be taxed?”. Devereux 
and Sorensen (2006) and Auerbach et al (2007) describe a matrix of alternative 
possible international tax regimes which answer these two questions in different ways. 
 
In the context of the appropriate taxation of international profit, it is worth raising the 
second question, if only to highlight the difficulties in interpreting the “effective tax 
rates” used, but not defined, in Sections 2 and 3. An important distinction here is 
between effective marginal and average tax rates.  
 
The most common measure used in economic theory is an effective marginal tax rate, 
which measures the percentage difference between the pre-tax and post-tax rates of 
return on a marginal investment. This is indeed the most appropriate use in the context 
of Section 2, where the analysis examines required rates of return, and by implication 
marginal investment projects. But it is well known that it is possible to design a tax 
system which in effect taxes only economic rent; since it does not tax a marginal 
project, the effective marginal tax rate is zero. A flow of funds tax (see, for example, 
Meade, 1978) or a tax with an ACE allowance (see IFS, 1990, Bond and Devereux, 
1995, 2003) has these properties. One way of achieving full harmonisation of 
effective marginal tax rates would therefore be to have cooperation over agreement to 
introduce such a tax base.  
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Unfortunately, however, even this approach would not achieve production efficiency 
in a broader context. This is because in a world with discrete investment choices, it is 
the effective average tax rate which affects those choices. The idea is that a company 
which is choosing between two profitable location decisions, for example, would 
choose the location with the higher post-tax net present value. The role of tax is in 
determining how much of the pre-tax net present value remains after tax: this is 
measured by the effective average tax rate (see Devereux and Griffith, 1998, 1999). 
Neither a cash flow tax nor a tax with an ACE allowance has a zero effective average 
tax rate. So, unless statutory tax rates were completely harmonised (as well as bases), 
investment decisions would remain distorted.  
 
Of course, the nature of the optimal tax system is in any case more difficult in such a 
setting, since it is a setting in which companies may earn an economic rent. As we 
discussed above, the presumption in favour of production efficiency strictly holds 
only when there is no economic rent or it is taxed at a rate of 100%. But if we aim to 
achieve production efficiency as an approximately optimal system, using taxes based 
on the residence or source of the company, then the presence of discrete choices does 
indicate that both effective marginal and effective average tax rates need to be 
harmonised. 
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper examines economic principles which underlie the optimal taxation of 
international corporate profit. Sections 2 and 3 review and extend the analysis of the 
forms of taxation which can generate global and national optimality respectively. 
Section 4 discusses issues which arise in attempting to implement a source-based tax, 
and Section 5 briefly raises issues concerning the nature of effective tax rates.  
 
Global optimality would generally be achieved by production efficiency. The analysis 
in section 2 demonstrates that – in the context of cross-border portfolio and direct 
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investment, as well as international trade in goods and services – taxes on a source or 
a residence basis would need to be fully harmonised to achieve production efficiency.  
 
The conditions for national optimality depend partly on the characteristics of the 
economy: the government could, in principle and in some cases, induce a welfare gain 
by stimulating or reducing outbound direct investment. However, Section 3 argues 
that a central case is where domestic and outbound investment are both financed at the 
margin by inflows of portfolio investment, and the country has no market power: in 
this case, there is no convincing argument for taxing the returns from outbound direct 
investment, even if domestic investment is taxed on a source-basis. This leads to a 
presumption in favour of source-based taxation.  
 
However, Section 4 considers a number of conceptual problems with the 
implementation of a source-based tax system, based on separate accounting. The first 
is whether there is, in many cases, a reasonable conceptual basis for allocating the 
global profits of a multinational company to individual jurisdictions. Broadly, global 
profits may be higher simply because the company is global: those returns are not 
directly related to specific economic activity taking place in a specific country. 
Particular conceptual and practical difficulties arise with debt finance and with 
transfer prices on the sale of goods and services within a multinational company. 
 
Another important issue considered is whether the return to debt finance should be 
treated differently from the return to equity finance. Many countries exempt foreign 
source dividends from tax but tax foreign source interest. There is no clear rationale 
for this distinction, which implies a source-basis for equity finance and a residence-
basis for debt finance.  
 
Consideration of the feasibility of source-based taxation does not paint a very 
optimistic picture of the future of taxes on corporate profit. And the paper has not 
taken account of tax competition, which appears to be driving down statutory rates of 
tax around the world. 
 
Can taxes on corporate profit survive in the long run, without doing too much harm in 
distorting corporate behaviour? Perhaps a more radical reform is called for. One 
 31 
possibility to consider is a destination-based tax, levied where sales are made to a 
final consumer (see Bond and Devereux, 2002, and Auerbach et al, 2008). If the final 
consumer is immobile, then such a tax would not distort the location of economic 
activities undertaken by companies. If it applies to all companies competing in the 
same market, it would not distort the pattern of competition. And since income would 
be measured only by reference to sales to a third party, intra-company transfers would 
not be taxable, and transfer pricing would become irrelevant. Such a tax therefore 
meets the objectives of a globally optimal tax system outlined above. It would also be 
optimal from the perspective of a single country, since no source or residence taxes 
would be applied in that country. If other countries maintained source-based taxes, 
then that country would attract higher inward direct investment. The feasibility of 
such a tax needs to be examined in more detail.  
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